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BOOK REVIEWS
Philosophy and the Christian Faith by Thomas V. Morris, editor. Notre
Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988. xiv + 300 pp. $3l.95,
cloth; $12.95, paper.
JAMES WM. MCCLENDON, JR., Church Divinity School of the Pacific,
Graduate Theological Union, Berkeley.
This volume represents an important tendency in the philosophy of religion.
It makes a turn away from problems in 'the philosophy of religion' as that
discipline was invented by Hume (Dialogues; Natural History) and Kant (the
Critiques and Religion within the Limits), and brings philosophical skills once
again to bear upon the intrinsic thought problems of the way of life shared
by Christian believers. This collection deserves to be judged as such a bellwether (rather than merely for the sterling merits of some of its essays), and
it is in that role that I will try to appraise it here. It will come out that
individual philosophers, in adjusting to the new demands, have retained preoccupations more attuned to the old, or have not sufficiently appreciated the
changed world in which they work. But it will also come out that almost
despite itself, Philosophy and the Christian Faith signals a definitive turn in
contemporary philosophy of religion.
The editor, Thomas V. Morris, generated the volume by promoting a conference at the University of Notre Dame. Morris believes that metaphysics,
natural theology, and "cognitive propositional theology" (George Lindbeck's
term) have never been refuted by modern thinkers such as Hume and Kant.
Since respected academic theologians have nevertheless taken this modernity
as definitive for their task, Morris sees the Christian philosophical challenge
to be the recovery of "theological realism" instantiated in the "classical
Christian doctrines" (pp. 4f.). Lindbeck (The Nature of Doctrine) has supposed
without adequate argument that Christian doctrines as such are 'grammatical'
rules governing Christian discourse. Morris sees Lindbeck as a reductionist, and
intends by presenting these essays (in tandem with his Logic of God Incarnate)
to defend instead a cognitive-propositional view of doctrine.
If this account of the editor's purpose is accurate, his view of the significance of this collection differs from that of the reviewer. The editor believes
that Hume and Company failed, and so believing philosophers must (if theologians will not) resume the interrupted doctrinal task. My beliefs about the
role of Hume and Company are too complex to present here, but I, too, think
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it is time to resume the doctrinal task, and think philosophers can help. Only
the new task will necessarily be different, because it will be a postmodern
one. So both the editor and the present reviewer turn away from modernity.
The editor reverts to the premodern; the reviewer (and George Lindbeck) turn
to the postmodern. Whether the essays under review fulfill the editor's project
or the reviewer's (or, by remaining 'modern,' fulfill neither) remains to be
ascertained.
All the essays address doctrinal or moral themes in Christian theology, and
all but one (Ross's) are interested primarily in doctrinal content rather than
justification or backing. Most develop one or another aspect of soteriology,
the doctrine of salvation, but one treats suffering as an aspect of God's love
and human love, while another is on the Trinity. To particularize: Richard
Swinburne (Oxford) writes about the "Christian Scheme of Salvation"; he
intends to show how the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ have
made salvation available, i.e., to set forth a theory of atonement. This theory
turns out to be Anselmic, though with a Grotian twist at the end. William
Wainwright (Wisconsin-Milwaukee) discusses "Original Sin," providing an
exposition and critique of Jonathan Edwards' version of that doctrine: only
those features of the doctrine that are implied by God's offer of grace should
be retained. Eleonore Stump (Virginia Polytechnic) writes on "Atonement
According to Aquinas." She presents a popular version of atonement theory
and shows it to be a debased version of a more coherent account. While she
bases the latter on Aquinas, her restatement owes much to Abelard. Marilyn
McCord Adams (UCLA) offers a straightforward biblical study, "Separation
and Reversal in Luke-Acts," designed to show that Luke-Acts steers a middle
course between (on the one hand) the melodramatic salvation history of early
apocalyptic and (on the other) theological universalism with its concept of a
God who has nothing to lose. William Alston (Syracuse) writes on "The
Indwelling of the Holy Spirit"; he attempts to say how the Spirit modifies a
believer's life in order to make it more christlike. Steering between a mere
"fiat" model and a mere "communication" model, he opts for a "sharing"
model in which the barriers between self and Spirit are increasingly broken
down in the course of Christian practice. Robert Merrihew Adams (UCLA)
explores "Christian Liberty." Even from the standpoint of the modified divine
command theory of ethics it is possible to construe the Christian moral life
as more than simple obedience to God's prior choices for us, provided we
construe that life partly along aesthetic lines. The woman who poured ointment on Jesus' head has done a "beautiful" thing. In "Warring Against the
Law of My Mind: Aquinas on Romans 7," Norman Kretzmann (Cornell)
explores the theory of human nature implied there by Paul. The Apostle's
professed inability to do what he wills to do is attributed by Aquinas to the
moral trouble that is "part of the human condition"; namely, that even re-
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deemed people are sometimes controlled by a "fomes" or spark of unreason
within human nature. But if so, their action then is not human action (since
for Aquinas humanity is defined by "reasonable"). Nicholas Wolterstorff(Calvin and Amsterdam), pursuing a long and subtle exploration of "Suffering
Love," argues that to attribute impassibility to God is a mistake, being based
on a Stoic not a biblical model; he concludes that suffering love is a necessary
and costly part of God's being and is meant to be part of our own. This forces
a revision of the low Augustinian estimate of the value of life in this present
world. Peter van Inwagen (Syracuse) treats the doctrine of the Trinity summarized in the (so-called) Athanasian Creed: "And Yet They Are Not Three
Gods But One God." Relative-identity logic permits a coherent formal statement of that doctrine. James Ross (Pennsylvania) writes on "Eschatological
Pragmatism," arguing that the truth of Christian teaching about the "Second
Coming," etc., consists in "cognitive consonance" between the believer's
current belief and cognition "in the end." He defends this view by a brief but
complex analysis of various sorts of "truth-making" claims, and finds that in
this case the relevant consonance is compatible with a wide set of present
Christian imaginings (as well as of unimaginable beliefs).
If theology and philosophy are indeed two disciplines not one, then when
philosophers set out to do theology they are in a sense (but not a pejorative
sense) amateurs, and it is interesting to see what light these learned theological amateurs have shed on the theological task. It is difficult to see that any
one philosophical ski1\ or tendency governs all the work. Marilyn Adams'
biblical study does not depend upon her philosophical skills; Bill Alston's
piece seems (to me) to presuppose no philosophical bias whatever. Certainly,
from essay to essay one detects characteristic bits of skill or presupposition,
some more common than others. Peter van Inwagen makes extensive use of
symbolic logic; William Wainwright and Bob Adams presume their own or
others' work in philosophical ethics; Jim Ross deploys current epistemology.
In the end I failed to find the heavy employment of metaphysics that Thomas
Morris's introduction had led me to expect, and I believe that David Hume,
were he to read the book, would find fuel for his philosophical flames only
in those few places in the essays that not only refer to, but seem also to
presuppose, the assumptions of medieval theologians (see especially Swinburne, Stump, and Kretzmann), while all the essayists engage those "matters
of fact" and "abstract reasoning" that Hume positively defended.
In fact, the philosophers in this collection seem to me to treat their chosen
doctrines very much as many present day theologians would. Today atonement theories are widely seen to fall into three main classes or groups: those
that see Christ's work aimed at God (or God the Father), those that see it as
aimed at man-the-sinner, and those that see it aimed at evil and its powers
(or at the devil). The modern period saw a shift from 'Godward' to 'manward'
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(or Abelardian) theories, and the 20th century witnessed a renewal of
'evilward' theories (Au len, Yoder). The atonement theorists in this volume
(Swinburne and Stump) both begin with classic Godward theories, but the
changes they propose reflect the 'manward' shift that marked 19th century
theologians such as Schleiermacher and Bushnell. Again, Wainwright's discussion of original sin modifies Edwards in just the directions that characterize modern theology generally, where the original doctrine of original sin
with its inherited guilt is (and ought to be) in a lot of trouble.
Why is this so? Why do these philosopher-theologians, Americans most,
Christians of independent judgment and obvious intellectual gifts, tend toward the 'liberal' theological drift of recent centuries, despite their express
conservative intent? I think the answer can be first seen by noting a method
most of them share-that of explanatory examples drawn from contemporary
common life. For example, Swinburne invokes a case of personal injury (your
best vase broken), while Stump weaves in the story of "Susan and David."
But, without naming the characters in their respective episodes, the same
thing is done by Alston (e.g., p. 134) and Bob Adams (p. 169), and Kretzmann
(p. 175), and Wolterstorff (p. 224), and Ross (p. 286). If asked why they
employ such examples, I think most of these philosophers would say it is to
make their concepts clear-concepts of guilt, or sharing, or freedom, or
passion, or self-awareness, or 'fit.' I do not reject the practice; indeed, it is
my own. I only note that by thus anchoring concepts in present-day life, we
inevitably give them a contemporary coloring-which means they will do
contemporary work but perhaps fail to do other work. Consider the difference
between anchoring our concepts in contemporary stories versus anchoring
them in biblical ones, though of course the contrast can't be a black and white
one, because the biblical stories themselves must be told in our languageand thus depend heavily upon our own conceptual scheme. My point is this:
the philosophers who write these doctrinal essays are willy nilIy so anchored,
themselves, in modernity. When they set out to give theological accounts of
themselves, even those who reject Hume and Kant and the entailed modernity
will make themselves clear only by invoking a conceptual world that displays
many of the features they wish to reject. No wonder their project partly fails
to reach the editor's formal goal. Despite him, metaphysics is played down
and matters of fact are played up. Despite him, doctrines come out looking
as much like Lindbeckian rules as they do like Morrisian cognitive propositions. Despite him, the contributors, in the content of their doctrines, often
sound as contemporary as contemporary theology itself.
And yet something new is happening here, nevertheless. It is displayed not
so much in the content of the doctrines explored as in the form in which they
are explored. I have already referred to this in a general way: here philosophers explore the particular contents of a faith, rather than laying down a pro-
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crustean bed of principles and then forcing the object of their religious desires
into it. I would like to illustrate this point by examining briefly one sample
essay-perhaps not the most impressive (is that Wolterstorff's?) or most
persuasive (Wainwright's?), but one that clearly exhibits the contemporary
features I find interesting. This is Peter van Inwagen's essay on the Trinity.
As already mentioned, van Inwagen sets out to defend the classic, creedal
doctrine he finds in the QUicunque Vult: God is one Being but three Persons.
Van Inwagen's discovery, following some work of Peter Geach, is that the
Trinitarian paradox can be resolved by restating the doctrine in the formal
language of relative-identity logic. I will suggest that the structure of van
Inwagen's paper has characteristic postmodern features, but before doing so
let me concede that it also displays marks of premodern thinking. Van Inwagen clearly intends to reaffirm the historic faith of the Christian church.
The Trinity is an essential and not an optional doctrine of Christian faith.
That Christian faith, as the pope has said, is no human invention. Faith is for
van Inwagen prior to knowledge (pp. 242f.). He is deternlined with his traditiori
to avoid both tritheism and modalism. Moreover, his doctrinal formulations seem
almost naive: While he has heard that "person" in Trinitarian theology does not
mean what it means in everyday English (as in fact it does not), he is content to
brush this aside with a remarkably ahistorical quotation from Geach (p. 248).
Thus if van Inwagen's essay does display postmodem tendencies, they will
apparently be in some tension with his own theological predelictions.
Now to the structure of the argument. There is a development within formal
logic called relative-identity logic (RI-logic). One of the features of this logic
is that predicates in its language cannot be "count-nouns," nouns that can be
pluralized and can be modified by the indefinite article. Thus in this language
one cannot say, "A is an apple"; one must instead say "For some B, A is the
same apple as B" (pp. 248f.). The reason for the circumlocution will appear
in due course. Once van Inwagen has laid down the vocabulary, formation
rules, and rules of inference of RI, it appears that what he calls "classical
identity" (a=b) has no role to play. It is necessary neither to acknowledge or
to exclude its existence. Perhaps classical identity is a special case within a
larger world of relative identities, much as Euclidian geometry is a special case
in the world of geometries. Now the goal is near: if the Christian believer, having
relinquished with RI language the old luxury of singular reference, can instead
make do with relative singular reference (a substitution suggested by Russell),
then ordinary referential English can successfully be translated into RI language.
But in that language, as the reader anticipates, it is also possible to express
without contradiction the principal theses of Trinitarian theology, and in the
remainder of the paper, van Inwagen spells out this result.
I note here three very broad, general features, one linguistic, one epistemological, and one metaphysical-ethical, that I believe underlie this exercise,
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with some (tentative) evidence for each. The evidence (and thus the conclusion) is necessarily tentative, for van Inwagen's is not an essay in the theory
of language or epistemology or metaphysics or ethics. Nevertheless, like all
intellectual work, it displays dimensions of each, and it may be that we can
detect these features.
First, what about the linguistic feature? The formal language, RI, in which
van Inwagen elects to express his traditional faith is neither the word-object
language of modern empiricism nor its contrary, the expressive language of
modern subjectivism. RI language might instead be characterized as a relational language-one in which the meaning of each part is indeterminate
apart from its relation to the other parts. The words we use, and what there
is, are not connected by a word-thing correspondence only, far less by the
mere connection of what we say to our inner dispositions or tendencies.
Rather our words do their work by way of their partnership in a logical
structure-in this case, RI-Iogic. Van Inwagen draws a useful analogy between applying RI-Iogic to the trinitarian doctrine of God and applying quantum field theory to particle physics: how can electrons be both waves and
particles? ("How can something be both a disturbance and a lump of stuff?")
Physicists believed both were true, but could not say how they were until
Dirac formulated quantum field theory (pp. 243f.). The illustration, though
not novel, is apt; so consider the implied theory of language: Is what makes
appropriate the application of quantum theory to particle physics (or the
application of RI-Iogic to the Trinity) just the bare linguistic correspondence
of modern empiricism, or the effluences of modern expressivism? Or is it not
rather the adequacy of a relational structure of language (namely, quantum
theory) to the 'world' of physics (or in the analogous case the adequacy of
RI-Iogic to the 'world' of faith)? The question is not merely whether RI-Iogic
(RI-Ianguage) is formally consistent, but whether it can tell us something
about God. As van Inwagen puts it, "One man's 'showing how something can
be both X and Y' is another man's 'constructing a formalism that allows you
to treat something as both X and Y without getting into trouble ...' As I read
van Inwagen, he leans strongly to the former alternative; he is interested in
RI-logic because it may count as "really having 'shown how something can
be'" (p. 273, note 4, quoting Polkinghorne).
The second broad feature, the epistemic, is closely related to the first, van
Inwagen's epistemic principle being neither the bare coherences of RI-logic,
nor merely the tradition of his church, but these in relation to one another
and to what there is. He is not a fideist saying "the Church says it, I believe
it, that settles it" or a rationalist who reserves all religious belief until it has
been established by rigorous argument, but one who bases knowledge upon
these (and perhaps other) elements in relation to one another. If this is
correct, van Inwagen's theory of knowledge can be called (following Quine)
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"wholistic": the truth of the parts is inseparable from the truth of the whole
set of his beliefs and convictions. A clue here is van Inwagen's remark (p.
253) that a chief interest of a logic such as RI is "such applications as it may
have"; I take him to mean the interest or value arising from our knowing what
is so by means of these applications.
The third broad feature underlying the paper is metaphysical-ethical. Here
there are more clues to van Inwagen's thinking. The first task in constructing
RI-Iogic is to free its user from the employment of 'count-nouns' (such as
"horse" or "god" -items that could be counted) that by their use commit the
user to there being the things it counts. For van Inwagen this is a prophylactic
measure: "If one says, 'The box weighs four pounds,' one does not lay oneself
open to the following sort of ontological interrogation: 'Just what is a
"pound"? What properties do these "pounds" have? You say the box weighs
four of them; but how many of them are there (in all, I mean)?'" (p. 249).
Yet this metaphysical caution does not signal any pervasive skepticism about
our access to what there is. For example, the construction of RI-Iogic involves
the consideration and rejection of a certain too-sweeping logical rule (the
Proposed Rule). And van Inwagen explains that "in refusing to add the Proposed Rule (or any restricted version of it) to RI-Iogic, we are in effect saying
that each dominance sentence [a technical term of the logic] embodies
a ... metaphysical thesis-one that ought not to be underwritten by the formal
logic of relative identity" (p. 253). What is that mischievous metaphysical
thesis? To put the matter over-simply, it is that as it is with anything (e.g.,
that if x is an apple, and green, and y is x, then y is a green apple also), so
it is with everything (e.g., that if x is divine, and a Fatber, and y is x, then y
must be not only divine, but a Father, not a Son or Spirit). In brief, what is,
is generic; that is the mischievous thesis in four words. An alternative to the
generic view of reality (so Alexander Blair has suggested to me) is a corporate
view: On it, each member of the whole exists and functions exactly in and
because of his or her relation to other members, and the whole is thus not the
mere assembly of units, but is itself relationally constituted. Van Inwagen
gives us a clue that his own metaphysics is of this corporate sort in his
explication of Trinitarian doctrine itself. Indeed, he underlines the primacy
of this metaphysical assumption: only if the love between the persons of the
Godhead is real can there be a real destiny for the church constituted by her
members' love one to another: "Vzta venturi saeculi is a corporate life ... the
whole Body of Christ coming to be an undistorted image of God" (p. 242).
Now since premodern and postmodern views of metaphysics and ethics
both stand in contrast to the modern view, someone may think that here Peter
van Inwagen tends rather toward editor Thomas Morris's "Introduction." But
as metaphysics is an area of overlap between pre- and postmodern thinking,
that is probably a matter that the clues and hints I have indicated cannot settle.
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The point, as my wife Nancey Murphy and I have claimed in a preliminary
way (see "Distinguishing Modern and Post modern Theologies," in April,
1989, Modern Theology), is that relationality in the theory of language, wholism in epistemology, and a corporate metaphysics and ethics are together
features that identify authentic postmodernism and distinguish it not only
from premodernity, but also from the merely modern age now ending. That
van Inwagen (and in varying degree other contributors to the Morris volume)
should so naturally display some of these postmodern features is an impressive fact. This is not to deny that all of them retain, as noted above, many
'modern' features in their work, and that some retain premodern features as
well. Perhaps most impressive is that almost to a man or woman they eschew
one of the chief features of the modern age, its foundationalist appeals to one
or another kind of unquestionable datum. Their attending instead to the particularities of Christian practice and its doctrines seems to me telling (though
not decisive) evidence of this crucial shift. If so, that is good news for
Christian faith in the world today and tomorrow.

Divine Nature and Human Language, by William P. Alston. Essays in Philosophical Theology. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1989. Pp.
xi and 279. Cloth $34.95; Paper $12.95.
RICHARD SWINBURNE, Oxford University.
This volume contains William Alston's main recent essays on the philosophy
of religion, apart from those concerned with religious experience (the material of which later he plans to incorporate into a book on that subject). Five
of the present essays are concerned with religious language, how we can use
words whose meaning is given by their application to mundane contexts, for
talking about God. Alston holds that a functionalist account of such mental
concept words as "knowledge" and "purpose" allows us to apply these words
literally to God in virtue of the effects of his activity. Just as talking about
human beliefs and purposes is talking about the causes of our public behaviour, according to the functionalist, so, according to Alston, talking about
God's knowledge and purposes is talking about the causes in him of the
effects in the world which he produces. That is so even if what divine knowledge and purposes are in themselves is utterly different from what human
knowledge and purposes are in themselves. Four further essays are concerned
with God's nature. Alston espouses what I would regard as a basically classical doctrine of God, while denying some of the more extravagant backing
which Aquinas provided for that doctrine-that God is not related to the
world, is pure actuality, is identical with his properties, and is such that every

